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BOOK REVIEWS

Tm; LAW·OF CONTRACTS. Samuel Williston, \Veld Professor of Law in Harvard University. New York. Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1920. In four
volumes. Vol. I, pp. xxiii, u55, Vol. II, pp. xxi, u57-2329.
Considered from almost any angle this is easily the best treatise on the
law of contracts in our language.
Two outstanding features of the book are defended in the preface. "Included within it are large portions of what is contained in works on Vendor
and Purchaser, Sales of Personal Property, Negotiable Instruments, Agency,
Bailments, Carriers, Landlord and Tenant, Insurance, Suretyship, Equity,
Master and Servant, Quasi-contract, Damages, Evidence. * * * The law of
contracts * * * after starting with some degree of unity now tends to fall
apart. * * * It therefore seems desirable to treat the subje:ct of contracts as
a whole, and to show the wid_e range of application of its principles." This
is a good text, hut herein is not the proper place for a homily on the rarely
other than accidental hyper-departmentalization of our legal thinking. Many
will regret that Professor Williston did not keep his work within the limits
of greater cc;mvenience in view of the number of other excellent treatises on
the collateral subjects mentioned but all will recognize that he was confronted
with the necessity of choosing between two (under our present classification)
necessary evils, whatever may be thought of the wisdom of the choice which
he has made.
The second aspect of the work defended in its preface is the amount of
space devoted to legal analysis and criticism. This needs no defense. It, to
the contrary, is the most valuable feature of the work-its principal and
wholly sufficient justification. Eliminate it and the book would approximate
the encyclopaediac vintage of which we suffer from no serious shortage.
Here is a text-book at once comprehensive and! critical to a degree not infrequently attempted hut rarely attained.
The author has adhered to familiar terminology in stating the results of
his analysis of the cases. Of this something has been,1 much may be, and
more will be, said. But two observations will be indulged in here. It is believed that the value of the book would have been added to if, by a judicious
use of a more incisive terminology, sharper distinctions had been made in
questions involving the difference between evidential as opposed to operative
facts and between facts as opposed to their legal consequences. So also in
situations where rights and powers need differentiating and factoring. However, the author might have gone to the opposite and more unfortunate extreme. He might have so busied himself in merely translating familiar
notions into a novel terminology as to have had left neither time nor energy
2 Sec review by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook,
J>roie>sor Arthur L. Corbin, 29 YALE L. JR. 942.
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for analysis. He has analyzed whatever may be thought of his analysis. In
hunting for a better platter to bring it on, he did not forget to cook the goose.
This treatise contains the author's third statement of his views on consideration.' Few legal topics have been discussed so carefully by so many
writers with such a multitude of conflicting conclusions. Professor Williston's final position viewed as a whole contains more good sense as to the
actual results reached by the cases than does that of any prior writer. But
the end is not yet. Discussion will follow discussion. Many will despair
and some will suggest emancipation by abolition, thereby attaining the sublime
in naivete. It may be, too, that some one sometime will content himself with
the prosy task of preparing a really complete list of the many distinct senses
in which the word "consideration" is· used by courts and academic writers
whence by a bare possibility it may appear that most of the discussions of the
doctrine of consideration hitherto had are comparable to an attempt to solve
some simultaneous quadratics with the value of X therein subject to like
change without notice.
In this work, too, is to be found the most careful and accurate marshaling of the decisions on contracts for the benefit of third persons. It would
not have been surprising had Professor Williston's objections on principle to
the results reached by the American cases abated: somewhat since his earlier
discussion of this subject." Other subjects treated in Volume I are formal
contracts, capacity of parties, joint contracts, assignment and the Statute
of Frauds.
The first half of Volume II is devoted to general principles of contract.
With the second half begins the discussion of special kinds of contracts mentioned in the preface, at which point interest recedes, again to mount when, in
later volumes, we shall get Professor Williston's ideas on such general subjects as impossibility, illegality and discharge. A noteworthy feature of the
first part of Volume II is the author's treatment of so-called conditions implied
in law in bilateral contracts. He prefers to find the logical basis for such
conditions in the fact that, just as the promises were the agreed exchange
each for the other when the contract was formed, so also the performance
by each party is, in the contemplation of the parties, to be exchanged for the
performance by the other party. § 813. It is to be noted that this theory
rests upon what the contemplation of the parties was. In consequence it
comes difficultly near to being the theory that so-called conditions implied in
law are merely the courts' construction of the language used by the parties, a
view which Professor Williston in the main rejects. § 8I3, Probably a
proper use of the construction method of attacking these problems will take
us farther in explaining the cases than is commonly supposed. Nevertheless,
it is true that this theory will not account for all of them. We finally reach
a point where we can no longer rely upon what the parties intended or contemplated because numerous situations evolve to which by no stretch of the
imagination can it be said that the minds of the parties ever adverted and
2
3

8 HARV. L. REV. 27; 27 HARv. L. REv. 503.
15 HARv. L. REV. 767.
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hence, concerning which, they could not have had any intention or have
indulged in any contemplation.
To this theory the author adds a defense of the use of the term, failure
of consideration. He admits that the content of the word, consideration, used
in this connection is not identical with that of its use in stating the law of
the formation of contracts. The term in both connections, he states, expresses the common and general idea of "exchange" or "price." In like
manner he sees accuracy in speaking of the consideration for a conveyance
or other executed act. But he adds, "The requirements for legally sufficient
consideration in one or the other case may differ, but that is another matter."
Whence one of two things appear: (1) he is attempting to establish and
defend one of the non-technical meanings of the word consideration, which
is· no concern of lawyers, and is asking us, already lost in the maze of this
word, to attempt to define a new .term, viz: "legally sufficient consideration,"
or (2) he has admitted the case against him.•• In this part of the law of contract he and we need a distinct term because we have here a distinct idea to
express. It would seem better to adopt a new term rather than further to
abuse that already prostituted word, "consideration." The author himself
witnesses to its uncertain character by himself using appositive expressions
in the same section in which he attempts to defend the use of the term, failure
of consideration. § 814
Now for more general matter. The publication of Professor Williston's
work on the formation of contracts is epochal in the development of the law
of s~mple contracts. The opening of the nineteenth century found the courts
under the· influence of a contemporary philosophy which laid undue stress on
the will as a determinative in social relations. § 20. From this influence we
inherited such notions as the necessity of a meeting of the minds and of an
intent to contract for the formation of a contract. Then followed the development of the notion that it was unreasonable to allow the existence of contractual liability to turn at all on what the defendant thought at the time of
the bargain if what he said and did reasonably indicated assent. Thus arose
an insurgency against the earlier view and the attendant conflict characterized
most of the latter part of the Nineteenth century. The crowning achievement
of Professor Williston's work in this field is that his is the final and successful
attack in the overthrow of this basic error with which we started. He has
adopted what may be called the objective as opposed to the subjective test and
has consistently applied it throughout his book. And it works. It accounts
for the cases. It can now be taken as definitely settled that the facts operative to pro.duce contractual liability are to be looked for not in what the
defendant thought but in what he said and did, reasonably interpreted.
But what of the plaintiff? One gets the impression from reading Pro•• Other parts of the hook seem to indicate that the author proposes the adoption
of the term, "legally sufficient consideration." See § IOI, for example. To admit that
it is necessary to use such polynomials is to admit that the subject has no terminology
of its own, or, at best, a very clumsy one, because there are equally cogent reasons for
adding "legally sufficient" to the terms, offer, acceptance, and the score or more of
other technical terms found in contract law.
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fessor Williston's discussion that he has, consciously or unconsciously, adopted
the objective test both in the case of a person seeking to escape contractual
duties and liabilities and in the case of a person seeking to assert contractual
duties and to exercise contractual powers. But these are distinct cases. Now
we may find ultimately that the test is objective in both, but that cannot be
assumed. Certainly there is nothing in the nature of things making that a
necessary result. It may be true but we must not in our enthusiasm for the
objective theory allow ourselves to be swept to an opposite extreme of error.
Who knows? It may be that the old subjective theory is yet a half truth,
wherefore its puzzling vitality. We may find: that one cannot assert rights
and powers unless he was actually, as well as reasonably, led to expect the
performance for which he sues, that upon such expectation he subjectively
relied at the time the alleged bargain was made.
A in jest makes an offer of a bilateral contract to B. B reasonably thinking A is serious accepts the offer. A sues B. A telegraph company raises
the price named in an offer of bilateral contract of sale. The offeree-vendee
accepts in ignorance of the error. The offeror-vendor learning of the mistake decides to hold the offeree to the higher figure. That B can hold A in
the first case and that in the second case ~he offeree can hold the offeror
where the error is in the opposite direction are applications of the thesis
which makes Professor Williston's work monumental. But his work does
not make a beginning toward the solution of the problem involved in the
cases as stated. Is the test objective or subjective as to the person seeking
to assert rights? That question is still ahead of us.
Now suppose a promise offered for an act. The act is done but not done
in reliance upon the offer. Nevertheless it is so done that to onlookers, the
offeror among them, it is apparently done in reliance upon the offer. May
the offeree hold the offeror? No assertion is now made that the test is not
objective. It may be that it is and that the offeror is liable, but it is unscientific
to assume so. The most ardent protagonists of the objective theory and the
greatest admirers of Professor Williston's championship of it cannot read
his attempt to apply it to this situation and wholly escape a feeling that the
effort is labored to say the least. § 67. It is commonly said that the act asked
for by the promisor must be done by the actor in reliance upon the offer.
Is it not possible that that means that the act must be caused by the offer?
If so, how can action be caused except by an antecedent state of mind induced
in the actor and that, too, an actual, real, or subjective state of mind, not an
apparent one?
Back to bilateral contracts. Another pure abstraction kindred to the one
just discussed which descended upon us from the introspecionists of the early
Nineteenth century is that off yonder somewhere in space is a thing called
a bilateral contract which, if it exists at all, automatically binds both parties
or binds neither; that the group of facts operative to bind one party is, in
some mysterious way, inherently and necessarily identical with the group of
facts operative to bind the other party. Now it may be that men do live and
move in the body of such an all-pervading and mysterious principle and it
may be that they do not. Professor Williston says, § 92, "Nothing is more
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fundamental thiln that in bilateral contracts both parties must be bound or
neither * * *." That may be so but the assertion is ventured that, at this
stage in our investigations, the proposition as stated is a pure assumption and
it is unfortunately made because, if accepted, further inquiry ceases. Nothing
so fundamental can be assumed. The cases must be e.xamined. If we recall
that in ou~ law parties to a contract do not litigate their relations each to the
other simultaneously, we should not be surprised to find what is the fact,
viz., the decisions do not make this a closed issue regardless of the generalities indulged in by the courts and text-writers. A single line of inquiry
is suggested. Dividing a normal or usual acceptance into its factual elements
we have: (a) a state of mind of assent, (b) an external act, (c)_ expressive of that state of mind, ( d) · of such a character as to come to the
knowledge of the offeror. Advancing from a to d, what is the minimum
necessary to render the transaction legally operative if (1) the offeree is
suing the offeror, (2) if the parties to the action are reversed?' May the
offeree vary from the offer as to (b), (c), and (d) according as he is suing
or is being sued ?0
No attempt has been made here to give even a partial catalogue of the
cases in which it is material to determine (I) whether the test is objective as
to both partie~ and (2) whether in bilateral contracts the groups of facts
operative to bind the two parties are identical. No answers to these two
questions are proposed. They are merely raised with a protest against assuming their answers.
Law students and the legal profession are deeply indebted to Professor
\Villiston 'for his giving them the results of his long and careful investigations. His work abounds in sane and well-matured conclusions richly rewarding his great industry, patience and thoroughness.
lliRMAN w. OLIPHANT.
University of Chiccrgo Law School.
TIFFANY oN REAI. PROPERTY (three volumes), by Herbert Thorndyke Tiffany,
of Baltimore, Maryland. Chicago, 1920. Callaghan & Company. Pp.
xxxii, 3666.
The ordinary textbook in law which is really only a statement of the
result of the cases is theoretically easy to write. The industry and patience
to examine a large number of cases and the ability to use understandable
English are the necessary qualities. There are, however, all too many of
these ordinary textbooks. Only occasionally do we :find a writer rising noticeably above the disappointingly common mediocrity. There are too few Wigmores, vVillistons, and Salmonds.
The writer of the noteworthy text must, of course, have the qualities
mentioned-industry and ability to write,-but he must have something more.
The ordinary writer can tell what the cases decided, the unusual writer does
•The author's criticism of Hallock v. Commercial Insurance, 26 N. J. L. 268, for
example, docs not consider the fact that in that case the offeror was suing the offeree.
•See for example 'Vhe..:ler v.· Klaholt, 178 Mass. 141.
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not only that but he draws sound inferences; the former makes use of the
cases, but the latter understands the historical, economic, social, etc., background and is familiar with the literature and thought upon the subject; the
former merely states results, the latter also weighs and tests them. The busy
lawyer who is looking for "a case" may prefer the ordinary book-he uses it
as a digest, but the lawyers and judges who play the largest part in shaping
our law will trade a shelf full of such ordinary books for the one that has
that additional something which makes it a real contribution to legal literature.
It was in 1903 that Professor Tiffany published the first edition of his
Real Property, a work in two volumes with 577 sections and 1323 pages.
Although this book fell short of the really remarkable contributions to legal
literature it was clearly one of the very best of the second class. The arrangement which was essentially that of Gray's Cases on Property was very
good and for conciseness and clarity of expression it would be hard to equal.
This quality made it a popular students' book. The cases cited were to the
point, and they were in sufficient number to make the book useful to practicing lawyers.
In 19!0 Professor Tiffany published his well known work on Landlord
and Tenant, a really remarkably good book, one which in the reviewer's
opinion is well entitled to rank with the best published in the last two decades.
It is so much superior to the rest of the American works on the same subject
that there is no basis for comparison. The author therein not only stated the
result of the cases in his characteri,tic, clear style but he also critically examined and discussed their conclusions and the doctrines announced by
the courts.
The quality of the first edition of the Real Property and the excellence of
the Landlord and Tenant led all students of the subject to look forward with
no little anticipation to the announced second edition of the Real Property.
By some it may be doubted whether this new edition is quit<! up to ihe reasonable expectations aroused by these earlier works. It is quite likely that
the book suffers by reason of its being mere!) a new editio11; the form
had already been cast.
To say that it is not equal to the Landlord and Tenant, however, is not
to condemn it. On the contrary this new edition is an extremely valuable
addition to Real Property literature. It is the old book brought down to date
with additional citations and discussion and something more. In many instances the content of the first edition is revised or amplified in the light of
the later cases and the author"s further reflection, and in the notes references are to be found to the wealth of material in the various legal periodicals,
material not usually found by the practitioner. This is one of the most valuable features of the new edition. The additions and amplifications have extended the work to 677 sections and 3666 rather large sized pages; approximately thirty thousand cases are cited. The disappointment of the reviewer
is not that the work falls short of being excellent, but that it does not come
quite up to the expectations aroused by the author's own work on Landlord
and Tenant. Unquestionably the present book is by far the best general text
on the subject of Real Property.
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It is of course obvious that in a work covering so large a. field as Real
Property and of a size so large as the one under review the captious critic
can point to errors in statement and omission and to failures to refer to certain authorities. Professor Tiffany's book is no exception. The errors, however, are few and relatively unimportant. Naturally there will be differences
of opinion in many instances as to the soundness of positions taken by the
author. But who could write a book as to which this would not apply?
This review should not close without a word of appreciation of the work
of the publishers. The three volumes though containing over thirty-six hundred pages are not unwieldy, the paper being thin. The pages are pleasing
to the eye and easy to read. Alt in all we feel the author and publishers are
to be congratulated.
RAr.PR
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